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I. INTRODUCTION
A great oil and gas boom is afoot in America and Canada and onshore
production is advancing at an extraordinary pace. For some states, this
production is without historical precedent. Consequently, they are now facing the
environmental and surface-use issues related to hydrocarbon development that
states with established production have wrestled with for a long time. Whatever
regulatory path these states with newer production decide to take, the laws and
regulations they have enacted or are considering will play a signiﬁcant role in how
gas, oil, and coalbed methane is ultimately developed in western America and
how that development will affect rural landowners and towns. Wyoming is in the
eye of this storm. Hitherto, Wyoming has been a minor producer compared to
some other states, but now that prices are hitting new records and technologies
and markets have developed for coalbed methane development, the eyes of the
energy industry are ﬁxed on Wyoming. It is currently undergoing a remarkable
boom cycle, particularly with the advent of coalbed methane development.
Wyoming has a sparse population, but must now begin to consider the results
of surface damage, water contamination of both aquifers and surface supplies,
and the tension between the surface and mineral owner that this rampant
development is bringing. Until recently, it had relatively few laws—some of which
were antiquated—on the books covering site remediation, water disposal from
production, and well bonding.
This paper examines three issues. The ﬁrst is recent legislation covering surface
damages and entry requirements for producers. Wyoming has recently joined
other states1 in passing a Surface Damage Act (“SDA”), designed to facilitate
communication between landowners and producers and lessen the domination of
the mineral estate over the surface owner in situations where the ownership of the
two estates are separate.2 How the new Wyoming laws compare with other states’
1
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia.
2

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 to -410 (2005).
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SDAs, related case law and experiences of producers in other states with SDAs is
discussed.
The second issue examined concerns regulations crafted to help prevent
groundwater contamination caused by coalbed methane development and
surface remediation and bonding. Currently, courts across the nation are seeing
an exceptional amount of litigation related to surface damages and remediation.
Experiences of the major producing states that have had longer experience with
legislated/regulated surface remediation are examined, as well as states whose
natural resources include those of aesthetic value.
The third topic of this paper concerns bond requirements for producers. The
experiences of the states and provinces have also proven that bonding requirements
are necessary to curtail the problems of orphaned wells—unproductive wells that
are abandoned without being properly plugged, and therefore, raise the specter
of groundwater contamination. To avoid this problem, Wyoming has enacted
bonding requirements for operators. Whether these are correctly structured to
prevent the problems encountered with bonding schemes in other states is open
to debate.
In all three areas, Wyoming’s current legal climate will be considered and
further suggestions will be made for a “best practices” approach to developing or
modifying regulatory oversights. This approach is designed to balance competing
concerns, thereby providing efﬁcient, responsible developments of oil, gas, and
mineral resources (including natural gas from coal) without damage to the surface
or subsurface aquifers. Observations and recommendations regarding Wyoming’s
process for facilitating communications between surface and mineral owners,
resolving valuation differences in an expedited, cost efﬁcient manner, and ensuring
timely and successful reclamation will also be discussed.

II. SURFACE DAMAGE ACTS AND ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
! )NTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada are two of the small number of countries where
a private surface owner can also own the oil and gas rights below, contrasting most
other countries where the national government owns the oil and gas.3 Typically,
if the surface owner also owns the mineral estate, he is happy to see the minerals
developed as this means income to him in the form of lease bonus, delay rentals,
and royalty. The surface and mineral estates can be separated however, and the two
owners (or oil and gas leaseholder) may be completely unknown to one another.

3
See EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.1, at 59 (1987) (noting
that the concept of private ownership of oil and gas rights is not the case in civil law countries).
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If the mineral estate has been separated from the surface, the surface owner may
have no ﬁnancial incentive to see minerals developed, and may be opposed if the
development will cause him nuisance or harm the value of his surface properties.
In addition, current high prices have empowered surface mineral owners to make
more demands from operators.
Historically, the mineral owner dominated the surface owner when the two
owners collided over issues relating to land use and mineral development. In its
most unvarnished form, this dominance meant the mineral owner had “the right
to use so much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary to enjoy the mineral
estate.”4 Later, the dominance of the mineral owner was attenuated somewhat by
the accommodation doctrine, which introduced the circumstance that a disruption
of the surface owner’s use of the land by subsequent mineral development might
require or force the mineral owner to use another “reasonable” method to develop
the mineral estate. The accommodation doctrine kept intact, however, the overall
doctrine of the dominance of the mineral estate—if no other reasonable method
existed for mineral development, then the mineral owner could go ahead with the
disruptive development without the surface owner’s consent and without being
liable for damages for the disruption. Oklahoma even adopted statutes to give the
mineral owner a private right of eminent domain over the surface for access to the
minerals.
Uncertainty exists over whether the accommodation doctrine exists in
Wyoming and, if so, to what extent. One landmark case, -INGO /IL 0RODUCERS
V +AMP #ATTLE #OMPANY, examined the terms of the original lease between the
parties, focusing on a liquidated damages clause the operator drafted covering
damage caused by access to the development site.5 Holding that the mineral
estate was dominant, the court found that the surface owner could not require the
execution of an agreement before access was permitted and that the lessee’s right
of access was “primary and fundamental.” The court therefore refused to extend
a liquidated damages provision beyond its speciﬁed term of one year.6 The lessee
already had the right, being the dominant estate, to possession as provided by the
oil and gas lease.7
In Texas, and other accommodation doctrine states, it is quite common for
informal, non-mandated meetings to be held between the developer and the
surface owner. In these meetings, the producer typically outlines his plan for
development, a timetable, and the parameters of the impending development.
However, such informal “handshake” agreements could not prevent some
litigation and in response to ranchers’ and farmers’ complaints. In an effort to
4

Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943).

5

776 P.2d 736 (Wyo. 1989).

6

)D at 740.

7

)D
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be viewed as pro-environment, politicians have stepped in to sand down with
legislation the perceived hard edges of the dominance of the mineral estate. These
efforts have led an increasing number of states to adopt SDAs.

" 3URFACE $AMAGE !CTS IN 'ENERAL
Along with Wyoming, ten states have enacted surface damage statutes to
help alleviate surface owners/users’ displeasure with the perceived imbalance of
power that mineral owners have over surface owners/users. They are designed
to compensate for damage caused by the mineral owner. Across the states that
have passed SDAs, the laws vary surprisingly little with regard to the major
components. Most contain entry notiﬁcation and negotiation requirements to
facilitate contact between operators and surface owners/users. Most also contain
bonding requirements and protocols on determining surface damage costs. Case
law related to such acts is, as yet, sparse.
Another common requirement in SDAs is the need for entry negotiations. In
these, the surface owner and the producer must begin negotiations before entry to
determine what the surface damages will be before the drilling begins. Oklahoma
requires negotiations begin within ﬁve days after providing notice to the surface
owner. Kentucky and Illinois mandate talks begin at least ﬁve days before drilling.
The other six states require that negotiations over surface damages begin after
drilling operations have begun.
Not surprisingly, these talks can lead to disagreement. If the landowner and
the producer cannot agree, then typically the landowner can bring suit or require
arbitration. To address this problem, some SDAs then delineate assessment
procedures in order to decide the amount of damages that are due (or are due
in the future if damage is done) to the landowner. Perhaps the most important
departure from the accommodation doctrine is that SDAs, while paying at least lip
service to the dominance of the mineral estate, now require payment for damages
to the surface estate—even if the actions of the mineral owner were reasonably
necessary for development and no other method was open to him.

# 7YOMINGS 3URFACE $AMAGE !CT
Wyoming’s 58th Legislature passed—and Governor Freudenthal signed—an
SDA entitled “Entry to Conduct Oil and Gas Operations” in 2005 (the “Act”).8
The Act was made effective on July 1, 2005 after several years of study by

8

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 to -410 (2005).
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industry 9 and agitation by landowners.10 The purpose of the Act was to provide
notice to surface owners of coming mineral development and, hopefully, cultivate
agreement between the surface owner and the developer.
The Act ﬁrst establishes the general dominance of the mineral estate, stating:
“Any oil and gas operator having the right to any oil and gas underlying the
surface of land may locate and enter the land for all purposes reasonable and
necessary to conduct oil and gas operations to remove the oil or gas underlying the
surface of that land.”11 After this broad declaration, however, the Act nods to the
accommodation doctrine by saying the developer must “reasonably accommodate
existing surface uses” and goes on to narrow the operator’s rights by imposing
certain pre-development requirements. Operators are allowed to enter to conduct
“non-surface disturbing activities” within which are included inspections, staking,
surveys, measurements, and general evaluation of proposed rights and sites for oil
and gas operations.12 These ﬁrst pass operations require at least ﬁve days notice to
the surface owner, with further notice required when new non-surface disturbing
activities are undertaken.13
Subsequent entry upon the land for “oil and gas operations” require more
elaborate notiﬁcations and it has been suggested that any activity that is not
considered a nonsurface disturbing activity counts as an “oil and gas operation.”14
The notice of entry for oil and gas operations must come not more than 180 days
and not less than thirty days before actual entrance to the land is proposed,15 and
must include the proposed dates of operation; the foreseen location of surface
facilities and all other appurtenants necessary for operations; contact information
of the operator; an offer to “discuss and negotiate” any proposed changes to the
plan of operations; and a copy of the Surface Damage Act of Wyoming.16
9
For example, in 2004, Apache Corporation, a large presence in Wyoming with holdings
such as the U-Cross Ranch, took the lead by presenting astute recommendations to state ofﬁcials
and industry regarding its vision for responsible development after collaboration with several
environmental studies and extensive legal research on other state SDAs.
10

For example, groups like the Powder River Basin Resource Council (“PRBRC”) scheduled
meetings with Governor Freudenthal of Wyoming, his energy advisor Steve Waddington, and
the Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) to express support for a “Surface Owner’s
Protection Bill”. Powder River Basin Resource Council, http://www.powderriverbasin.org (last
visited Apr. 9, 2009). Their handbill for the June 13, 2004 meeting with Mr. Waddington and
the DEQ representatives exhorted surface owners to show up to avoid letting “streamlining of
permitting [to] take away your right to protect your property.” )D.
11

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(a) (2005).

12

)D § 30-5-402(b).

13

)D

Estee A. Sanchez, Esq., New Wyoming Surface Use Statutes, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN LANDMAN
(Denver Assoc. of Petroleum Landman), Summer, Vol. 23, Issue 9, p. 3.
14

15

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402(d).

16

)D § 30-5-402(e).
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The developer must attempt good faith negotiations in order to reach
a surface use agreement.17 The surface use agreement should describe what
methods will be used to protect surface resources, describe the compensation to
the surface owner for any damages to the lands and improvements thereon, and
provide details of a timely completion of reclamation activities.18 In order for the
surface use agreement to be valid for the purpose of satisfying the surface-useagreement option for allowing entry (as described later in this section), it must
provide that the developer will compensate the surface owner for losses of land
and improvement value and losses from lessened production and income from the
land. Importantly, the damages provided for are only to be applied to the lands
directly affected by production and the surface owner cannot separate from the
surface estate the right to receive surface damages.
During the negotiations, either party can seek arbitration or mediation or
invoke Wyoming Statute §§ 11-41-101 to -110, providing informal procedures
for resolving disputes through the Wyoming Agriculture and Natural Resource
Mediation Board. Finally, if a surface use agreement is made, the oil and gas
operator is directed by the Surface Damage Act to avoid “substantially and
materially different” operations from those listed in the Development Plan.19
After notice and negotiations, the developer must satisfy one of the following
conditions: (i) acquire a waiver by all the surface owners that will allow the oil
and gas producer to begin operations; (ii) obtain a surface use agreement as
described above which provides for improvements pursuant to Wyoming Statute
§ 30-5-405 (2005); (iii) secure a waiver as described in Wyoming Statute
§ 30-5-408 (2005); or (iv) should the producer not desire to seek an executed
Surface Use Agreement, simple consent or waiver, he can choose to execute a surety
bond or other guaranty to the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
(the “Commission”) for the use of the surface owner to obtain payment for any
surface damages caused by operations.20 This surety bond must follow the form
set by the Commission, must be at least $2000 per well, and may be a blanket
bond that covers a number of wells.21 The Commission then notiﬁes the surface
owner of the bond, which starts a thirty day period wherein the surface owner

17

)D § 30-5-402(f ).

18

)D § 30-5-405(c)(i) and (ii). These payments are described in Wyoming Statute § 30-5405 and include payments to the surface owner which include damages sustained by the surface
owner for loss of production, income, land value and value of improvements caused by oil and gas
operations.
19

)D § 30-5-402(g).

20

)D § 30-5-404(b)(iv). A process of approval described in Wyoming Statute § 30-5-404
determines the amount of the bond.
21

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-404 (2005).
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can object to the amount. Should an objection occur, the Commission will step
in and determine the bond amount depending on the speciﬁc circumstances.22
In order to help ensure operator compliance with the Act, § 30-5-403 (2005)
of the Wyoming code states that an application for a drilling permit will not
be approved by the Commission until the oil and gas operator ﬁles with the
Commission the following:
(1) The surface owner’s name and contact information;
(2) A statement that notice was given to the surface owner of
proposed oil and gas operations;
(3 A statement that the surface owner and oil and gas operator
attempted good faith negotiations to reach a surface use
agreement; and
(4) A statement that the oil and gas operator has either secured
the written consent, waiver, or surface use agreement or has
ﬁled with the State a surface damages bond.
A surface owner has two years after the discovery of damage to the surface
estate to make a claim for damages under the Act if a developer has started
operations without any agreement in place regarding compensation for damage
to the surface as described above.23 The surface owner must give notice of this
damage to both the developer and the Commission.24 After such notiﬁcation, the
operator must make a written offer to settle within sixty days and, unless a written
agreement between the parties provides for another remedy, the surface owner can
accept or reject the offer of the developer.25 Should the Commission reject the
claim of the surface owner, the surface owner can seek redress in the state district
court.26 Surface damages can be recovered for loss of production and income from
the surface, and loss of market value and value of improvements—should the
operators not pay within sixty days of the due date, the amount owed can double.27
Note that no allowance is made, when measuring damages for “reasonable use,” to
defer any portion of the loss of marketable value—any adverse affect on the price
appears to be compensable.

22

)D

23

)D § 30-5-406.

24

)D

25

)D

26

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-406.

27

)D § 30-5-405.
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A statute of limitations is included in the Act that precludes actions not
brought within two years of the discovery—or the time whereat the damages
should have been discovered—to recover damages to the surface estate.28 This
provision is tolled for four months if a written notice of damages is provided by
the surface owner.29

$ #OMPARISONS WITH .EIGHBORING 3TATES.ORTH $AKOTA AND -ONTANA
Western states, because of their extensive production and the advent of coalbed
methane (“CBM”) development, have some of the most commented-upon and
extensive SDAs. Oklahoma, because of the extensive production in the state, the
fact that its SDA was ﬁrst in the west, and because the state has produced most
of the case law, is often seen as having the “ﬂagship” SDA30 and is a popular
yardstick for other states to measure themselves against. Oklahoma’s assessment
scheme for a surface damage settlement changes the “reasonable use” doctrine
found in Texas and other states without SDAs. Instead of the requirement that
landowners show that the producer had done something unreasonable and that
other alternatives existed to avoid harming the landowner’s preexisting use—a
fairly high bar to meet—Oklahoma’s SDA deﬁnes a compensable damage merely
as something with “adverse affect on the price” of the land. This arguably has
the effect of making the mineral owner’s use comparable to a pipeline easement,
invoking condemnation law. Pipelines, however, are an easement whereas the
owners of a mineral estate are not trespassers—quite the contrary in that they
are the owners of the dominant estate. Additionally, surface owners often beneﬁt
from mineral development through bonuses and/or royalties, whereas pipelines
do not provide any beneﬁts to the surface owner. More speciﬁcs of the various
SDAs in the Western States are detailed in Appendix A.
North Dakota and Montana had surface damage acts on the books before
Wyoming. North Dakota currently requires that the mineral developer provide
written notice of the development plan to the surface owner within twenty days
of the start of operations.31 This notice must detail the development plan and
provide notiﬁcation of the rights afforded the surface owner by the Act.32 Along
with the notice, the producer must make an offer of settlement to compensate
the surface owner for damages.33 If the surface owner rejects the settlement offer,
he may bring suit in the appropriate district court. Should the award granted
by the court exceed the initial settlement offer, the developer must pay court

28

)D § 30-5-409.

29

)D

30

OKLA STAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2 to 318.9 (Supp. 2000).

31

N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-05 (2001).

32

)D.

33

)D § 38-11.1-08.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

9

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 2, Art. 3

422

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

costs and interest.34 Unlike Oklahoma, North Dakota’s SDA expressly lists what a
surface owner can recover for in the state’s SDA.35 North Dakota’s SDA expressly
delineates actions affording damages—reimbursement is required for the lost
value of surface improvements, lost use and access to the surface, loss of market
value, and the loss of agricultural production and income.36 North Dakota does
not require a bond for surface development.
Montana’s SDA is quite similar. Written notiﬁcation is again required of
the producer to the surface owner not more than ninety days or less than ten
days prior to entry and must relate the proposed operations.37 Montana does not
require a surface bond and mirrors North Dakota in requiring damages for loss
of value to surface improvements, loss of land value, and loss of production and
income from agriculture.38 After entry, the surface owner has two years to notify
the mineral developer of damages. Upon such notiﬁcation, the developer has sixty
days to make an offer of restitution. The surface owner can accept or ﬁle suit in
the appropriate state district court.39 Whatever the route to calculating damages,
payment must be made within sixty days of the agreement or award, or the surface
owner is entitled to twice the amount of the owed damages.40
The major difference between the North Dakota and Montana is timing
of payment of surface damages. North Dakota requires the parties to speculate
on the damages and agree—or seek a judicial determination if no agreement is
reached—on a settlement beforehand. Montana’s statute considers damages in
retrospect, with the surface owner essentially keeping tabs and presenting a bill
after the alleged damage is done.

% !NALYSIS AND #OMMENT
 'ENERAL )NTENT
Resolving the tension between the surface owner/user and the mineral
developer is a matter of balancing incentives to produce minerals with concern for
accommodating the surface owner and/or tenant regarding speciﬁc and narrowlydeﬁned matters. It should not be simply a way for surface owners to shake down
producers for no other reason than their presence. Generally, Wyoming’s surface
damage act has achieved this.

34

)D § 38-11.1-09.

35

)D § 38-11.1-04.

36

N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04.

37

MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 82-10-503 and 82-111-122 (2004).

38

)D § 82-10-504.

39

)D §§ 82-10-506 to 508.

40

)D § 82-10-504.
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The broadly worded declaration beginning the SDA stating the mineral estate
remains dominant over the surface estate is a good, if vague, declaration of intent.
If “push comes to shove” and the mineral owner is dead-set on production and
the surface owner is equally adamant against production, the mineral estate owner
should prevail.
The judicially created accommodation doctrine still championed in Texas,
and a host of the other states, still has two major advantages over Wyoming’s efforts
to address the split estate issue. First, if the development is reasonable and there
is no other economic way to accomplish it, then no damages are forthcoming.
Production must be encouraged because development of mineral resources is not
only a matter of positive economic beneﬁt; it is a function of national security in
the face of a turbulent world energy market. It is not just historical dogma that
keeps the mineral estate dominant, but political, military, and economic realities
that recognize the absolute necessity of promoting domestic production. Second,
and related to the ﬁrst point, the surface owner is not automatically entitled to
damages if production is reasonable and damages happen to occur, or—as is the
unfortunate case now in several states—even if no real damages occur except that
the land is entered. Past some nominal payments, damages should be curtailed to
those that occur if a surface land use or improvement that pre-dates the mineral
development is damaged by a speciﬁc act of mineral development that could
have been reasonably achieved another way, or one that damages surface use and
enjoyment in a speciﬁc and narrowly-deﬁned circumstance.
Compensable damages, however, as deﬁned in the Wyoming statute, are
worrisome. Compensable damages are deﬁned by the statute as “[a] sum of money
or other compensation equal to the amount of damages sustained by the surface
owner for loss of production and income, loss of land value and loss of value of
improvements caused by oil and gas operations.”41 This deﬁnition, standing alone,
could open the door to the problem in Oklahoma, namely that compensable
damages are not tethered by the accommodation doctrine’s theory of reasonable
use, instead including any damages caused by the reasonable development of
the minerals—even if the damages were caused by reasonable use. The attempts
to curtail these compensable damages in the subsequent section by adding the
following clause, “[t]he payments contemplated by this subsection shall only cover
land directly affected by oil and gas operations. Payments under this subsection
are intended to compensate the surface owner for damage and disruption”42 fail
to rein in damages that would be associated with reasonable development of the
land. Unlike North Dakota, where only certain express actions and damages are
compensable, in Wyoming, any diminution in value is compensable. Again, this
sounds like a pipeline condemnation action. Mineral developers, however, are not
trespassers.
41

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-405(a)(i) (2005) (emphasis added).

42

)D § 30-5-405(a)(iii).
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Wyoming’s SDA stipulates that if the surface owner ﬁles a claim for damages
with the Commission against a developer who has not made a Development Plan
or other acceptable arrangement with the surface owner, then the developer must
offer a settlement within sixty days. This protocol appears to be an incentive for
producers to have a Development Plan in place. While encouraging Development
Plans is a laudable goal, the Commission should not require a producer to offer
a settlement if there was no other reasonable alternative method for mineral
development than the one the developer chose. In addition, a surface damage act
should not encourage surface owners/users to feel they are automatically entitled
to “damages” without some sort of actual damages. Although the surface owner
should be compensated for adverse impact of mineral development, adverse
impact on the price should have some threshold relative to the mineral owner’s
reasonable use right. Furthermore, even if damages recoverable through SDAs
are to be extended past surface damage caused by use unreasonable for mineral
development, all SDAs should at least echo the wisdom of Oklahoma’s recent case
limiting SDA recovery to the lessee’s exercise of his right to enter and use the land
for development.43
Producers in Wyoming should have the opportunity to litigate all tortious
claims in an Article III court. SDAs are not substitutes for standard civil actions
brought on by tortious activities such as negligent surface damage or pollution.
Recently, the Oklahoma Civil Appellate Court ruled that a lessor must bring
a separate cause of action in the event of nuisance or the negligent inﬂiction
of pollution.44 The court agreed with the producer-defendant who argued that
the Oklahoma SDA only allows damages to be granted based on the operator’s
entrance and use of the leased premises.45 This is good news for producers who
might otherwise not have a fair opportunity to defend tort claims but rather have
to pay some administrative penalty based on the claims of assessors, without due
process.
Another source of tension not yet addressed by the new Wyoming laws is how
they interact with areas where the surface is owned by private Wyomingites and
the minerals are owned by the federal government. Wyoming, a relative latecomer
into the Union, was a federal territory before admission, and in large portions of
the state, the federal government retained the mineral rights to the land while
divesting the surface to private citizens and the state.
Onshore Oil and Gas Order Number 1, (the “Order”) as amended in 2006,
provides the requirements necessary for the approval of all proposed oil and gas
exploratory, development, or service wells on all Federal and Indian onshore oil

43

Vastar Resources, Inc. v. Howard, 38 P.3d 236 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001).

44

)D.

45

)D at 240–41.
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and gas leases, including leases where the surface is managed by the U.S. Forest
Service. The Order also covers approvals necessary for subsequent well operations,
including abandonment. The changes would include new requirements for
development on split estates; a new approval process for multiple wells based on
a single environmental review and a Master Development Plan; and additional
bonding requirements.46
The federal Order provides for lower minimum bond amounts than the
new Wyoming law and a less complex system for calculating and providing
compensation to affected surface owners for a narrower range of types of surface
property damage. Neither law makes it clear which applies when the mineral
owner is the federal government. Naturally, given the difference in the bonds and
the process for determining surface damages, producers and landowners will likely
have a set of laws they would like to apply differently from their counterpart.
Both the Wyoming Attorney General and publicists for Governor Freudenthal
have been quoted by press sources expressing their beliefs that the Wyoming law
applies.47 In response, the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
issued a letter to Don J. Likwartz, Wyoming Oil and Gas Supervisor, on June 13,
2005, expressing the BLM’s view that the federal law prevails.

 0RE PRODUCTION 2EQUIREMENTS
A surface damage act should address all stages of development. Before
production begins, the mineral owner should be required to notify at least one
surface owner and the surface owner’s tenant, if applicable, a number of days
before land entry and the notiﬁcation should contain information necessary
to allow the land owner to assess what effect the development might have on
his surface estate. The parties should be required in some way to get together
and discuss the plans for mineral development and address any concerns that
the surface owner has over the proposed development. These differences should
be documented—making damage assessment by appraisers easier or, at worst,
leaving a paper trail for subsequent litigation. In many cases, practically speaking,
differences that cannot be worked around could lead to a check being written and
a settlement made on the spot between landowner and company landman.
Wyoming’s SDA does not entirely accomplish these pre-production goals. As
noted above, operators are allowed to enter to conduct “non-surface disturbing
activities” if they give at least ﬁve days of notice to the landowner. Even though

46
Onshore Oil and Gas, Order No. 1, 48 Fed. Reg. 48916 (Oct. 21, 1983), as amended at
48 Fed. Reg. 56226 (1983) and 72 Fed. Reg. 10328 (2007). Dated December 1, 2006, not codiﬁed
in the Code of Federal Regulations.
47

Richard W. Goeken, #ONmICT ,OOMS OVER &EDERAL AND 3TATE 2EGULATION OF !CCESS TO &EDERAL
/IL  'AS ,EASES ON 3PLIT %STATE ,ANDS, http://www.saltmanandstevens.com/pdf/split_estate_article_
draft_5.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2009).
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the surface owner has thirty days to protest after the surface bond is posted, a
common complaint raised by landowners is that once the bond is posted,
immediate access is granted to the producer for these ﬁrst look activities. Once
the Commission gets the protest, they have seven days to respond. This has led to
scenarios where the developer posts bond and conducts geophysical surveys and
other pre-development activities quickly without having to wait for the outcome
of the Commission’s examination of the complaint.48 One solution for this
problem would be to delay entry for the developer until after the Commission
has had an opportunity to respond to the landowner’s complaint.
As expected, the concerns of landowners in Wyoming over the ability of
developers to “bond-on” and avoid negotiations altogether mirror concerns in
other states. “Bonding-on” happens when producers ask the Commission for
permission to conduct operations without the surface owner’s approval. Although
the Act encourages producers to contact and negotiate with landowners, it
ultimately acknowledges that mineral owners, and by proxy their leased developers,
should be able to develop without subjecting their entry and development plan
to approval by the landowner. This has led to contested bond amounts before
the Commission, with the landowner claiming the bonds are not high enough
to cover reclamation if the producer defaults on its obligations and the producer
pointing towards the numerical limits in the statute of $2000 per well.49

 2EQUIREMENTS $URING 0RODUCTION
During production, the surface owner should not be able to halt entry
and development once the pre-production phase is complete, save for gross
negligence and/or willful misconduct. The bar for collectable damages should
not be an “adverse affect on the price” as in Oklahoma. This makes the entrance
and development much like a pipeline easement—which it is not. Mineral
development is not an easement because the mineral producer has the right to
develop his asset and is not a trespasser.50 In addition, often times the surface owner
stands to gain from the production, whereas a pipeline provides no beneﬁt to the
surface owner.51 The bar in Wyoming should be the one used in Texas: damage
caused by unreasonable use of the land, plus any speciﬁc items that the legislature
deems worthy of protecting, such as the actual farmstead or other particular
classes of ﬁxtures. A nexus needs to exist between the three-part 'ETTY analysis,
as used in Texas and other accommodation doctrine states, and the modern

48

Interview with Llysia Sechrist, Legal Assistant, Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission in Cheyenne, Wyo., (Nov. 28, 2007).
49

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-404 (2005).

50

Personal communication, Professor Owen Anderson—Eugene Kuntz Chair of Oil and
Gas, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2004.
51

)D
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SDA.52 If the mineral production upsets a use that predates development and
that development could have been accomplished another way (such as directional
drilling), with a cost comparable to the cost actually used to develop, the surface
owner should be able to go through the assessment process for the collection
of damages. This analysis, combined with simple distance limitations preventing
development within a certain distance from houses and other structures along
with the inclusion of pollution, debris left at the drill site, and improperly plugged
and abandoned holes in the damage assessment, would seem to provide the
correct balance between the mineral and surface estate. In addition, injunctions
should be discouraged. If the correct procedure is followed and the entrance by
the mineral developer passes whatever 'ETTY-like analysis is required by the SDA,
no injunction should be forthcoming to halt production except those necessary to
allow time to go to the conservation commission and show the procedures were
not followed.

 0OST DEVELOPMENT
Post-development estate relationships center on damages done during
production. Here, it is important to see that actual, demonstrated, or evidenced
damages yield compensation, but also that the SDA does not come to be seen as
an automatic payday when mineral developers appear at the gate. The goal must
be accurate assessment.
One beneﬁt of the Wyoming SDA is that it avoids the wrangling over the
appointment of three assessors to tally surface damages. In Oklahoma, the
developer and the landowner each appoint an assessor who, in turn, jointly appoint
a third. The traditional three-member panel of assessors has been a popular way
to assess damages, with each side appointing an assessor and the third being
appointed by the ﬁrst two—or a local court when the ﬁrst two cannot agree. The
problems arise when the third member is partial to one side. Oklahoma, faced
with the problem of the third member often being favorable to one side or another
despite the merits of the case, has attempted to solve the problem by making
certiﬁcation of the assessors by the state mandatory.53 Although this would help
eliminate assessors without any experience and knowledge and, perhaps, obvious
“sweetheart” appointments—such as a rancher picking a neighbor—it may be
better if the state has a cadre of professional assessors from which the ﬁrst two
assessors, the court, or the appropriate state agency could choose. “Professional”
status would mean being licensed after testing and accreditation by the state.
It is also important for the values reached to have some relevance to the real
world. In other words, the value of the land should be limited to tangible loss
of value, and not sentimental value or the dubious values associated with loss of
52

Getty Oil v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621–622 (Tex. 1971).

53

For a further description of the Oklahoma SDA, please see Appendix A.
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a remotely-possible future use. Wyoming’s SDA should more expressly disallow
valuation of damages based upon sentimental value or loss of alleged future use.
Another possibility may be to allow “reasonable use” so that mere entry is not
an event meriting damages. The current Wyoming SDA makes no allowance
for “reasonable use” when considering the amount of damages. This may result
in alleged damages of questionable merit cited simply to “nickel and dime” the
damage assessment. Furthermore, a requirement that the money paid is actually
used to remediate and improve the land should be considered, while allowing
for reasonable attorney’s fees on a non-contingent basis. Finally, the county tax
assessor should be privy to the assessments made by the assessing tribunal. This
will help prevent results that are inconsistent with assessments by other state and
local agencies.54

III. PRODUCED WATER/GROUNDWATER AND SITE REMEDIATION
! )NTRODUCTION
Oil and gas development has long been recognized as a source of concern for
groundwater and surface water contamination elsewhere in the country.55 Being
relatively arid, Wyoming—with its low population and historically less-proliﬁc
hydrocarbon development—is initiating widespread protective measures for
groundwater. Coalbed methane production (“CBM”) is especially challenging
because the process produces considerable water.56 The variability of produced
water quality, however, makes regional classiﬁcation difﬁcult and potentially
inaccurate. Economic waste could result by having the same regulations that
require expensive remediation efforts for low quality water to also govern high
quality produced water.
Nationally, litigation for environmental damage is on the upswing, and it
seems logical that where water contamination occurs, litigation will closely follow.
Litigation has already erupted concerning permitting of CBM development on
federal and state land.57 This ﬁrst wave of lawsuits will soon give way to actions on
54
Gene Gallegos, a seasoned oil and gas lawyer in Santa Fe, New Mexico, strongly disagreed
with this suggestion, commenting that trying to intertwine land values as they relate to remediation
costs to property tax assessment values was unworkable because the tax assessment values are made
for fairly and equitably raising property tax dollars and are not made with an eye toward remediation
assessment.

VITO NUCCIO, COALBED METHANE—POTENTIAL AND CONCERNS, U. S. Geological Survey
Fact Sheet FS-123-00 at 2 (2000), http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs123-00/fs123-00.pdf (last visited
March 31, 2009).
55

56
RUCKELSHAUS INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, WATER PRODUCTION
COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN WYOMING: A SUMMARY OF QUANTITY AND MANAGEMENT
OPTIONS 10 (2005) [hereinafter RUCKELSHAUS REPORT].

FROM

57
Appendix B of this report details some current cases moving through the administrative
and judicial process in Wyoming and Montana related to CBM development.
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private land. Recently, courts and juries in other states have handed out startling
damage awards, including astronomical punitive awards. Hopefully, this can
be prevented in Wyoming to some degree if site remediation and groundwater
concerns are adequately addressed. Regulations should be rigorous yet ﬂexible
allowing responsible operators to produce without the specter of outrageous
judgments. Concurrently, Wyoming should put the state in the best position
to quickly identify and curtail production by “ﬂy-by-nighters” and by so doing,
soothe the worries of surface owners concerned about rampant CBM development
causing environmental damage.

" #URRENT 7YOMING 2EGULATIONS
 #OALBED -ETHANE 0RODUCED 7ATER
In the last four years, Wyoming—led by a governor’s ofﬁce seemingly well
advised by academic and industry groups—has enacted several measures dealing
with groundwater protection related to hydrocarbon production. The Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality (the “WDEQ”)58 and the Commission
have responded to groundwater concerns raised by CBM development.
Before production of CBM, the gas is trapped within the coal and only
becomes mobile once the reservoir pressure is decreased by pumping water out of
the coal seams.59 Produced water can be reinjected, hauled away in disposal trucks,
or treated and piped for beneﬁcial uses such as irrigation, stock ponds, or even
drinking water.60 Most often this water is stored in wastewater impoundments.61
Water taken from deeper depths is much more likely to be briny than water found
in shallow aquifers and contain higher levels of dissolved solids.62 The water, if
not removed or drained down a channel, either evaporates or inﬁltrates back into
the ground. If this water is contaminated with brine, or if a large volume of
produced water leaches out constituents in the soil and introduces these elements
into a shallow aquifer, water production becomes problematic because the
impoundments can then introduce the briny water from the deeper reservoir into
the (generally) freshwater shallow reservoirs. The quality of the produced water can

58
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, http://deq.state.wy.us/ (last visited
March 31, 2009).
59

NUCCIO, supra note 55.

60

)D

61

)D at 2.

62

C.A. RICE, M.S. ELLIE & J.H. BULLOCK, JR., WATER CO-PRODUCED WITH COALBED METHANE

IN THE POWDER RIVER BASIN, WYOMING: PRELIMINARY COMPOSITIONAL DATA, U. S. Geological Survey

Open File Report 00-372 at 4 (2000), http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2000/ofr-00-372/OF00-372.pdf
(last visited March 31, 2009).
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be better than the local surface water and shallow aquifers.63 For example, in the
Powder River Basin, where nearly all of Wyoming’s CBM is currently produced,
the quality of CBM-produced water generally increases when moving from Belle
Fourche, Powder River and Little Powder River drainages southeastward toward
the Cheyenne River drainage.64 In these areas with cleaner CBM-produced
water—particularly in drought conditions—the local surface owners and users
welcome the produced water and want to use it to irrigate crops and water cattle.
The steep increase in CBM development and the large volume of water
produced by CBM development and production has resulted in large numbers of
impoundments to hold the produced water. Impoundments are small man-made
ponds that hold the plentiful water that springs from CBM development. These
impoundments are either created by damming an existing natural channel or
stream (“on-channel”) or by excavating a pit or pond elsewhere (“off-channel”).
Reclamation of impoundments is one of the few instances in Wyoming where
remediation is required outside of contractually-based obligations.65 Bonding
and subsequent reclamation of on-channel reservoirs is made obligatory by the
WDEQ through regulations promulgated in August 2005, and revised in June
2007 (described below). Off-channel impoundments are the domain of the
Commission and the Ofﬁce of State Lands and Investments (“OSLI”). On federal
lands, the BLM requires bonding and reclamation on federal oil and gas leases.
Which agency’s rules apply depends on not only whether the impoundment is
off-channel or on-channel, but also on whether the surface and mineral estates are
privately owned, owned by the state, or federally owned.66
Reclamation of impoundments after CBM production ceases is seen as
necessary lest un-reclaimed pits fragment and isolate drainages. Reclamation also
prevents exposure of selenium and dry impoundment bottoms yielding dust,
63
See Thomas F. Darin, 7ASTE OR 7ASTED 2ETHINKING THE 2EGULATION OF #OALBED -ETHANE
"YPRODUCT 7ATER IN THE 2OCKY -OUNTAINS ! #OMPARATIVE !NALYSIS OF !PPROACHES TO #OALBED -ETHANE
0RODUCED 7ATER 1UALITY ,EGAL )SSUES IN 5TAH .EW -EXICO #OLORADO -ONTANA  7YOMING, 17 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 281 (2002).
64

RUCKELSHAUS REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.

65

On-channel regulations are described in the “Implementation Guidance for Reclamation and
Bonding of On-Channel Reservoirs that Store Coalbed Natural Gas Produced Water” promulgated
to implement the requirements of § 35-11-102 of the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act as they
cover reclamation of on-channel impoundments. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality,
Water Quality Division, )MPLEMENTATION 'UIDANCE FOR 2ECLAMATION AND "ONDING OF /N #HANNEL
2ESERVOIRS THAT 3TORE #OALBED .ATURAL 'AS 0RODUCED 7ATER, August 2005, available at http://deq.state.
wy.us/wqd/WYPDES_Permitting/WYPDES_cbm/downloads/BONDING_GUIDANCE-CBM.
pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Implementation Guidance].
66

Fortunately, the WDEQ maintains a chart on their website that distills the question
of whose remediation and bonding regulations apply to an elementary process. See Wyoming
Department of Environmental Quality, 2ESERVOIR "ONDING AND 2ECLAMATION 'UIDANCE, available at
http://deq.state.wy.us/wqd/WYPDES_Permitting/WYPDES_cbm/cbm.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2009).
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invasive weeds and other undesirable ﬂora.67 The bonding is intended to pay for
reclamation of the impoundment after production has ceased if the operator does
not conduct such operations himself.
The non-federal off-channel regulations of impoundments are the province
of the Commission and the OSLI. Section 1(r) of Chapter 4 of the regulation
effective February 11, 2008 and promulgated by the Commission requires
completion of “Form 14A” for construction and maintenance of produced water
pits. Additional information may be required by the Commission if the land
affected by the impoundment meets the Commission deﬁnition of a “critical area”
as deﬁned in Chapter 4.
With respect to “off-channel” impoundments, the WDEQ ﬁrst enacted rules
in 2002 and 2004 that attempted to address the issue of contamination caused by
use of surface impoundments.68 These rules were superseded in September 2006.69
Because of contamination concerns, the WDEQ announced steps necessary for
issuance of new CBM water discharge permits whereby the operator using the
discharge impoundment demonstrates, through groundwater monitoring and
geochemical sampling of the surrounding soils, that the produced water will
not degrade shallow aquifers to a lower classiﬁcation. Monitoring is to continue
through all phases of production. This mandated sampling will eventually delineate
statewide areas with clean water that require less control and areas with polluted
discharge that may require the prohibition of the use of impoundments. The
WDEQ has divided the Powder River Basin into smaller drainage areas, making
the policy ﬂexible enough to deal with areas of differing levels of contaminates.70
Bonding where BLM rules apply is based upon a professional engineer’s
estimate of reclamation costs for the impoundment. The Commission requires a
bond based upon the written estimate of a professional engineer. WDEQ bonding
requirements are as follows:

67

Implementation Guidance, supra note 66.

68

Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, Water Quality Division, Compliance
-ONITORING FOR 'ROUNDWATER 0ROTECTION "ENEATH 5NLINED #OALBED -ETHANE 0RODUCED 7ATER
)MPOUNDMENTS, November 2008 (Revised), http://deq.state.wy.us/wqd/groundwater/downloads/
CBM/8-1043-Compliance%20Monitoring%20and%20Siting%20Requirements_Impoundments_
Oct%2008revision%20_2_%20with%20doc%20num%20and%20Attachments.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Compliance Monitoring]; /FF CHANNEL 5NLINED #"- 0RODUCED 7ATER 0IT
3ITING 'UIDELINES FOR THE 0OWDER 2IVER "ASIN 7YOMING, Guidance Document, Wyoming Department
of Environmental Quality, August 6, 2002.
69

Compliance Monitoring, supra note 68.

70

3EE 7ATERSHED BASED 790$%3 0ERMITTING 3CHEDULE FOR THE 0OWER 2IVER "ASIN 7YOMING, a
map maintained on the website of the WDEQ.
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(1) $7,500 for on-channel impoundments less than 5,000 cubic
yards of earthwork;
(2) $12,500 for on-channel impoundments less than 5,000
cubic yards of earthwork;
(3) For on-channel impoundments greater than 10,000 cubic
yards of earthwork, the security amount must be based upon
a certiﬁed professional engineer’s estimate of reclamation
including costs to remove all ancillary equipment.71
These bonding requirements include a 3.0% inﬂationary escalation scale.
Remediation requirements across the agencies all have similar aspects.
For example, the WDEQ requires that topsoil be set aside and replaced if the
impoundment is to be reclaimed and not left for the landowner. Harmful evaporates
like halite must be removed after production ceases and the impoundment ﬁlled.
The soil must meet WDEQ Land Quality Division speciﬁcations. Once the
original grade is reconﬁgured and the topsoil replaced, the producer is required to
“seed and mulch the area with a native grass and shrub seed mixture, unless the
landowner speciﬁes some other seed mixture consistent with the use.”72
Secondary development of CBM can be achieved by enhanced stimulation
techniques such as hydraulic fracturing. This technique involves high-pressure
injection of ﬂuid (generally water), and in some places sand, into a CBM-bearing
formation. The high-pressure ﬂuid fractures the reservoir and the sand enters the
cracks, propping them open. The ﬂuid is then drawn out, but the sand remains,
keeping the cracks open to enhance production. Complaints have occurred when
diesel fuel used as a surfactant in the injection ﬂuid caused bacteria blooms in
nearby water wells. However, once use of diesel fuel was voluntarily curtailed
as an injection ﬂuid additive, the Environmental Protection Agency found that
injection or “frac’ing” ﬂuid presented no danger to groundwater in a study that
looked at wells in eleven coal basins and compared the results of over 200 peerreviewed studies.73

71

)D. § 5(f ).

72

)D § 5(c).

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, June 2004, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_exec_summ.
pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (providing the results of the study).
73
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 3ITE 2EMEDIATION
Generally, impoundments must be remediated within one year of the
date of last use.74 Because of their possible use to surface owners, and because
CBM-produced water can often be put to beneﬁcial surface use, produced water
impoundments may be left undemolished with the approval of the WDEQ if not
subject to other regulations. If the impoundment is to be left in place, however,
a written agreement executed and notarized by the surface owner expressing a
willingness to accept future responsibility for the impoundment and its potential
contents describing the location, size, and including a cost estimate for pit
demolition prepared by a professional engineer with expertise in pit remediation,
must be approved by the WDEQ.75
The level of remediation required is not expressed clearly in the regulations.
Unlike plugging operations, the potential cost of site remediation is more variable
and often depends on state mandates governing the level of remediation and the
climate of the area, whether arid or humid. For example, restoring a pad site to
the exact same look it had before development takes longer and requires more
work in arid regions where the foliage can take decades to return. Wyoming is an
arid state—foliage cannot be expected to grow back at the same rate as in a humid
state like Louisiana. The close well spacing necessary for optimal development of
CBM (without directional drilling) requires a thick network of roads to access
each ten acre site, crosshatching former wilderness with potentially unsightly and
dusty roads and dotting it with impoundments. Conversely, some ranchers like
the roads because it gives them better access to their land and impoundments
ﬁlled with high quality water may be welcome.

# 4HE h)MPLIED #OVENANT TO 2ESTOREv  4ROUBLING $AMAGE !WARDSTHE
,OUISIANA %XPERIENCE
The above exposition on regulations governing the surface footprint of CBM
development represents mandated surface use limitations and remediation rules
rooted in concern related to surface and groundwater quality. These regulations
appear to not require surface remediation or use limitations based on any other
presuppositions.
A common worry of producers and operators is liability for environmental
damage. Awards for damage to the surface—making companies liable for
unreasonable damage to the surface estate—has made the operators more
conscientious about working with surface owners and acting with a lighter touch.
The informal and non-mandated meetings between developers and land owners

74

WOGCC Reg. Chap. 4, § 1(qq).

75

)D
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to discuss future mineral development common in the production industry
evidence this awareness.
While some states, by statute or regulation, require that developers remediate
certain disruptions to the surface estate, as for example the aforementioned
mandated remediation of impoundments in Wyoming, no state legislature or
court has instituted an implied covenant to restore the surface. Recently, however,
Louisiana courts and juries delivered a Faustian jambalaya of disturbing portents
for operators in that state. First, in #ORBELLO V )OWA 0RODUCTION,76 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana afﬁrmed a $33 million award for breach of an express covenant
in a surface lease requiring restoration of the surface, holding that for breach of
contract, the costs of restoration are not limited by the fair market value of the
property restored. The court opined,
[W]e decline to set forth a rule of law . . . that in cases of breach
of a contractual obligation of restoration in a lease, the damage
award to [the surface owning] plaintiffs must be tethered to the
market value of the property. To do so would give license to
oil companies to perform their operations in any manner with
indifference to the aftermath of its operations because of the
assurance that it would not be responsible for the full cost of
restoration.77
No promising lights shine down this road. In addition to the mistake of
“tortifying” contract law, the potential for astronomical damages, where the
amount rewarded is no longer “tethered” to any realistic measure of the land, is
immense. The potential for economic waste is also heightened: most prospective
acreage is leased many times as generations of explorationists use new technology
to wring more from ﬁelds. Even if the money collected in damages is actually
put into remediation such that the land is returned to its (alleged) original shape,
much remediated land is simply leased again, with the same damage done—and
the same improvements, such as canals and roads, being re-dug and re-slashed.
Next, consider the “implied covenant to restore” the leased acreage. In
4ERREBONNE 0ARISH 3CHOOL "OARD (“TPSB”) V #ASTEX %NERGY )NC,78 a Louisiana
Court of Appeals majority ruled that under the Louisiana Mineral Code

76

850 So. 2d 686, 694–95 (La. 2003).

77

)D at 695.

78

878 So. 2d 522, 528 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2004) (petition for cert. accepted as No. 04-C-968
in La. S. Ct.).
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§ 31.122,79 “there is an obligation to restore the surface of the land subject to an
oil and gas lease despite the lack of an express provision so requiring.” This implied
obligation is “to restore the surface of the lease premises as near as is practical to its
original condition.” The judgment was amended to provide that defendants “are
solitarily obligated to TPSB for the restoration to TPSB’s property to a condition
as near as practicable to its pre-lease condition.” Prior to the decision, Louisiana
jurisprudence did not require lessees to restore the land used for gas and oil
production unless either an express agreement was reached in writing with the
lessor, or the lessor gave proof that the operator had been negligent and caused
unreasonable damage to the surface or engaged in excessive use.80 The majority
did not balance restoration costs against the fair market value of the acreage, nor
the fact that the surface owner intended to re-lease the property again for mineral
development. Instead, the majority focused on, inter alia, the “intrinsic value”
of Louisiana’s swamps to society,81 the “global-wide beneﬁts restoration of this
state’s wetlands provide”,82 and what the lower court perceived to be “the rich
reward of the oil industry.”83 Any implied duty invoked by Louisiana Mineral
Code § 31.122 must be tied to the prudent operator standard, yet in Terrebonne
no evidence existed that a reasonably prudent operator would have backﬁlled the
canals in question or that construction of the canals was an unreasonable use of
the land and not in accordance with common industry practice.
Fortunately, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this decision in a split
decision in January 2005.84 The high court of Louisiana opined:
Although the temptation may be to thrust a great part of the
solution to the problem of coastal restoration upon the oil and
gas companies and other private parties, rather than the state
and federal governments currently faced with underwriting the
expense of restoration, we decline to do so out of respect for the
terms of the mineral lease to which the parties agreed.85

79

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:122 (2009).
A mineral lessee is not under a ﬁduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound
to perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property
leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual beneﬁt of himself and his
lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on
the part of the lessee.

)D
80

Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 104 So. 2d 253, 255–56 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1958).

81

Terrebonne, 878 So. 2d at 19.

82

)D at 20.

83

)D at 19.

84

Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 801 (La. 2005).

85

)D at 792.
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The decision of the Louisiana court of appeals—and the subsequent reversal
by the Louisiana Supreme Court—represent points on a continuum that the
courts and legislature of Wyoming need to consider and choose wherein they will
lie. The effect of Corbello and the decision of the court of appeals in Terrebonne,
if applied in tandem, would certainly make producers think twice about land use,
perhaps making them back off altogether from exploration. Taken together, even
if a lease lacks any express requirement for remediation of the leasehold back to
“original” condition, an implied covenant has been found to exist requiring this
remediation—and the damages for breach of this implied covenant will not be
limited by the market value of the leasehold.

$ !NALYSIS AND 2ECOMMENDATIONS
Natural gas is a clean-burning fuel, the production of which should be
facilitated responsibly. CBM development allows economic beneﬁts to ﬂow into
the state and enhances national security by decreasing dependence on foreign
liqueﬁed natural gas (“LNG”). Development of CBM should not be discouraged
by the threat of completely unreasonable surface remediation damage awards and
outrageous punitive damages.
Happily, with the rules enacted by the WDEQ in 2004 controlling water
quality standards for, and monitoring of, impoundments, Wyoming has taken
a big step towards responsible CBM development. Of course, the state must
vigorously follow up on the data garnered by the reporting mechanisms in these
regulations to see if the problems caused by contaminated water disposal are being
alleviated. If this proves not to be the case, the state may need to consider ﬁnancial
mechanisms to ensure responsible drilling and water disposal, keeping in mind
that the real test for whether any bonding-supported remediation system works is
when the exploitation ceases because of lower prices. Blanket bonds and lowered
bond requirements for long-time producers should never be allowed and each
impoundment should always have a speciﬁc bond covering it.
Should bonding beyond that necessary to insure reclamation of impoundments
be required for remediation of possible surface damage in Wyoming? No other
state requires bonding for surface remediation by developers, although several
states have some peripheral ways of raising money for surface remediation. For
example, Texas sets aside a portion of the oil spill cleanup fund for site remediation.
The Oklahoma Energy Resource Board86 (the “OERB”) performs some surface
remediation along with its primary mission of plugging orphaned wells. The
OERB is funded through a voluntary one-tenth of one percent assessment on the
sale of oil and natural gas in Oklahoma. Any producer or royalty owner who does
not wish to participate in the program can apply for a refund, but historically, 95%

86

Oklahoma Energy Resource Board, http://www.oerb.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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of all contributions remain in the OERB’s coffers. In no state, however, is surface
remediation afforded anywhere near the priority of orphaned well plugging.
Each well site is different and many variables control the type of surface
damage that might occur; thus predicting the amount necessary to require for such
a bond is likely to be fraught with a great deal of speculation. Bonding for surface
remediation should probably be considered only if other surface remediation
remedies do not assist with the problem, and if adopted, should only be required
in the amount necessary to remove obvious signs of development, such as removal
of leftover equipment, the plowing-up of service roads, the leveling of unwanted
water impoundments, and development leftovers of that nature.
Also, when considering mandatory site remediation bonding and the measure
of potential damages being considered for the establishment of bond values, the
diminution of land value if remediation is not made should typically be the value
used to set the bond, not the cost to remediate the land back into the exact same
condition that existed before development. This paradigm recognizes a couple
things. Foliage grows more slowly in the West and while an area may require
replanting, the replaced fauna should not have to mimic immediately the original
fauna. Also, land is often re-leased, and Lessee A should not necessarily have to
remediate land back to pristine conditions just before the land is re-leased to
Lessee B, who then develops the lease in much the same way Lessee A had done.
In other words, what is the sense in remediation of a roadway or canal one lessee
built just so that the next lessee can rebuild it?
Classiﬁcation of the produced water must recognize that various levels and
types of pollutants exist in different areas. Furthermore, the WDEQ might want to
address whether localized small scale degradation really matters. If no one will use
the water in or near that location, expensive measures to maintain water quality
may not be necessary or practical. Flexibility is the key—water produced varies in
quality statewide, a fact recognized by the WDEQ in its recent regulations.
If responsible companies follow state-established procedures, their liability
should be reduced, particularly when considering punitive damages. It makes
sense to limit awards to the value of the land or the price it takes to remediate
it, whatever is less. Finally, awards for surface damages ought to go toward
remediation—not into the pockets of plaintiff ’s attorneys and landowners who
then turn around and re-lease the land to another developer. The state has no
interest in seeing surface damage claims turn into a lottery for plaintiffs and a
payday for mercenary plaintiff attorneys while the problems of surface damages
remain unsolved. Finally, hydraulic fracturing ﬂuids do not pose a threat to
groundwater and so do not logically factor into any bonding scheme or any
surface damage calculations.
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Surface owners should not be able to recover for surface damage occurring
before purchase of the property when such damage was discovered before purchase
in the absence of the assignment of such a claim. Suits of this sort typically
are difﬁcult to win. For example, a Texas appellate court recently ruled that a
cause of action for injury to real property accrues to the person who owns the
property at the time of the injury and, absent an express assignment of the cause
of action to a subsequent owner, the current owner lacks standing.87 Additionally,
allowing landowners to recoup the full cost of remediation for pollution caused by
contamination from orphaned wells—instead of just the diminution in value—is
seen as a litigation-based stimulant because it would open the door to increased
liability for contamination. Agencies and courts are struggling with damage
awards for common surface damages such as those caused by the presence of
leftover production equipment and surface pollution. The case law, as described
below with regards to recent developments in Louisiana, can yield frighteningly
huge judgments when total remediation is required. Like full remediation of
surface damages, requiring full remediation of an aquifer contaminated by
orphaned wells—particularly an aquifer away from any productive use—may
result in astronomical judgments. Limiting recovery to the diminution of value,
unless reckless conduct or willful conduct is involved, takes economic factors into
consideration, promotes mineral development, and prevents economic waste.
One pleasant side effect of the new regulations concerning CBM development
and its impact on groundwater is that by addressing—if only in some aspects—the
topic of groundwater, surface water, and site remediation, Wyoming courts will
have some legislative landmarks in which to ground their opinions in the inevitable
cases that will arise as the CBM boom continues in Wyoming. Jurisprudence will
hopefully develop such that Wyoming will follow the more conservative models
for surface restoration. Heeding the cautionary tale of Louisiana, no implied
covenant to remediate a leasehold back to its original condition—particularly in
arid Wyoming—should exist, and surface damage awards should at least be tied
to the fair market value of the land.

IV. BONDING AND ORPHANED WELLS
! )NTRODUCTION
The recent increase in gas prices combined with the relatively shallow depths
required for a successful CBM well has led to a dramatic increase in the number
of wells drilled in Wyoming and neighboring states and the decrease of the
average spacing between wells. A vehicle to properly plug and abandon wells left

87

Exxon Corp. v. Pluff, 94 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex. Comm’n App. 2002). In addition, the court
ruled no express or implied duty existed for the oil company to remove oilﬁeld materials from the
property.
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as orphaned wells was needed. This led many states to require operators put up
a bond before drilling so that if an insolvent operator does not properly plug
and abandon a non-productive well, the state can pay to have the well plugged.
Orphan wells present the problem of contamination when water migrates to
shallow aquifers through leaks in casing or cement behind casing. A properly
plugged well has a cement barrier preventing the ﬂow of saline-rich waters in
contaminated aquifers into fresh water aquifers closer to the surface. Improperly
plugged or completely unplugged wells do not have the cement barrier and present
a contamination threat. The cost of plugging wells varies widely, averaging about
$12,500–$15,000 for traditional oil and gas wells, but occasionally costing much
more. No technology presently exists to restore a regionally contaminated aquifer.

" #URRENT 7YOMING 2EGULATIONS
Wyoming requires a compliance bond to drill in the state, which is collected
by the Commission.88 The size of the bond for drilling is dependent on the depth
of the well. Bonds for wells less than 2,000 feet are $10,000 for an individual
bond or $75,000 for a blanket bond. A blanket bond is a single bond that covers
all the wells in a certain area, typically a state. Wells deeper than 2,000 feet require
a $20,000 individual bond or, as before, a $75,000 blanket bond. Wyoming’s
requirements for bonding necessitate an additional bonding up to $3 per foot for
idle wells in excess of 8,300 feet or 25,000 feet, depending on the bond in place.
Currently, ﬁve options exist for companies to choose from:
(1) Owner’s surety bond ($10,000 or $20,000 as applicable)
(2) Owner’s blanket bond ($75,000)
(3) Letter of Credit
(4) Certiﬁcate of Deposit
(5) Cash (cashier’s check)
On state lands, the bond of the producer is paid to the Wyoming Commissioner
of Public Lands in the amount of $10,000 for an individual well or $100,000 for
a blanket bond.

# /RPHANED 7ELL 0ROBLEMSTHE 4EXAS %XPERIENCE
The best way to consider Wyoming’s possible future regarding bonding is
to consider Texas’ past. The biggest change, and the cause of the greatest howl
among the regulated in Texas, is the Texas Railroad Commission’s (the “RRC”)

88
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conversation Commission, #HAPTER  /PERATIONAL 2ULES $RILLING
2ULES http://soswy.state.wy.us/RULES/rules/6913.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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move towards substantial and universal bonding. Universal bonding, without
opportunity for additional deposits, “good guy” grandfathering, or other
alternatives to bonding, is the ultimate destination of producer security regulation
in Texas.
Texas has perhaps the greatest problem with orphaned wells, and it is one of
the missions of the RRC 89 to prevent the orphaning of wells and to oversee the
proper plugging and abandonment of orphaned wells. In order to produce in
Texas, at least in theory, a prospective operator must prove to the state that it is
ﬁnancially capable of properly plugging and abandoning its wells. In 2004, Texas
had about 355,000 wells, 112,013 shut-in (nonproductive) wells and 242,932
productive wells. By the end of January 2004, higher risk, unbonded companies
operated 7,313 wells. The RRC rules require operators to plug/abandon or shut-in
wells, but industry insiders suggest this is not rigorously enforced. For example,
loopholes can be used to circumvent this requirement. An operator is allowed to
treat an entire lease as a single entity. So, for example, if there are ten wells on a lease
and only one is a producer, then the other nine holes need not be plugged until
the one well stops producing. By the time that happens, the operating company
may be bankrupt. The likelihood of bankruptcy increases as the production
decreases over time because wells with dwindling production typically get sold
down the company “food chain” so that wells circling the drain of economic
viability are common in the portfolio of ﬁnancially unstable corporations. These
companies often go out of business, orphaning a large group of wells in one fell
swoop. In a few cases, unbonded operators intentionally accumulated inactive
wells and striped the wells of salvage. Then they went out of business, orphaning
many wells at once.90
The current public plugging mechanism for orphaned wells in Texas, the
Oilﬁeld Cleanup Fund, does not cover the cost of plugging orphaned wells, a
problem made worse by the fact that many operators cannot be made to pay
because of subsequent bankruptcy. Until recently, unbonded operators in Texas
managed to perpetually avoid plugging wells by paying a $100-per well licensing
fee annually. This fee could be paid in lieu of plugging the well properly.
Legal and equitable remedies can be a challenge to landowners. If saltwater
from an unplugged oil well contaminates freshwater wells on an adjoining piece
of land, that landowner can bring a “trespass suit for damage to land.” This has a
two-year statute of limitations, tolling from “ﬁrst injury”—not from detection of

89
The Texas Railroad Commission regulates oil and gas operators within Texas. Railroad
Commission of Texas, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us (last visited Apr. 1,2009).
90

Personal communication, Professor Owen Anderson—Eugene Kuntz Chair of Oil and
Gas, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2004.
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the injury. Two recent cases, 7ALTON V 0HILLIPS 0ETROLEUM #O91 and %XXON V 0LUFF, 92
have limited a landowner’s recovery for damages to diminution of the land’s value,
not cost of remediation. Furthermore, “trespass suit for damage to land” does not
include attorney’s fees. Those fees are deducted from any award—a deduction
that could discourage plaintiff ’s attorneys.
After the implementation of new bonding rules, producers in Texas had the
following two options to satisfy the necessity of ﬁscal assurance that they will
properly plug and abandon wells: 93
(1) A bond or letter of credit based on the total footage of the
wells operated; or
(2) A bond or letter of credit based on the number of wells
operated.
Prior to making the ﬁnancial requirements more strictly controlled, concern
existed that these changes would make it difﬁcult for small operators to stay
in business. This fear has apparently not materialized. Although the number
of operators did indeed drop annually from 2001–2003, this seems merely
a continuation of the drop in the number of active operators that has steadily
declined since before 1990; subsequently, the number of operators is increasing
considerably. The cost to maintain an inactive company has increased from $100
to $1000 in March 2002, thus increasing the incentive for owners to ﬁnally shut
down long-lingering inactive companies. In addition, company registration costs
with the state went from the $300–$1000 range to $300–$1125 over the same
period. The bottom line appears to be that operators that are not ﬁnancially
solvent enough to post an adequate bond are far more likely to not properly plug
and abandon a well.
The RRC’s other tactics for solving the orphan well problem have been
threefold. First, a limit to the transfer of inactive wells has been suggested, keeping
unproductive wells attached to the companies who originally owned—and are
liable—for them. Further, it is suggested that the number of plugging extensions,
via dodges like the $100/year fee, has been curtailed. Increased funding of the
RRC’s plugging program through increased fees, a more robust bonding and
letter of credit plan, and more vigorous state action in going after offenders with
substantial ﬁnes are all beginning to better address the orphan well problem.
91

Walton v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 65 S.W.3d 262, 272 n.3 (Tex. Comm’n App. 2001).

92

94 S.W.3d at 22.

93

"ONDING 2EQUIREMENTS FOR /IL  'AS %XPORTERS (EARING "EFORE THE ( %NERGY 2ESOURCES #OMM
(Tx. 2004) (testimony of Michael Williams, Commisioner of The Railroad Commission of Texas)
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/commissioners/williams/newscenter/House_Energy_Testimony_3-24.
pdf (last visited April 5, 2009).
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$ !LBERTA
On the other end of the spectrum is Alberta, Canada, whose regulatory
experiences with orphaned wells are much less problematic. The well plugging
authority in Alberta is the Orphan Well Association (the “OWA”) that operates
with ﬁscal independence under authority of the Alberta Energy and Utilities
Board (the “AEUB”). Of course, Alberta has fewer wells to worry about (and less
people to complain about them) than Texas and also has been aided by a more
proactive approach toward remediation and plugging. First, reasonable attempts
are made by the agencies to recover money from responsible parties before wells
are determined to be orphaned. After a well is deemed orphan, the OWA can
conduct the orphan abandonment plan. The AEUB receives funding from two
sources. The ﬁrst source is the Orphan Fund levy, where funds are collected from
the “upstream” oil and gas industry with each company being levied based on its
proportionate share of “deemed liabilities” compared to total industry deemed
liability. In the past, the agency has based the annual levy for the orphan fund on
the number of inactive wells each company held at the end of the previous year.94
The second source of funds is a ﬁrst time licensee fee. Recently, revenues were
increased because of an increase in applications for a ﬁrst time licensee fee for each
operator. This fee is $10,000 and is charged to each new company wishing to hold
well licenses.

% !NALYSIS AND #OMMENT
Preventing orphaned wells is a two-step process. The ﬁrst is to prevent a rush
of ﬁnancially unstable producers from beginning development. The second is to
assure that state conservation efforts to manage production of oil, gas, and CBM
through pooling and unitization do not encourage economic waste and needless
wells that could be orphaned, as happened in Texas.
In order to ensure that funds are available for the proper plugging of orphaned
wells, Wyoming should assume every well will be orphaned and plugging costs will
ultimately be borne by the state. The necessity of this assumption was lain bare by
the unfortunate scenario that unfolded in Texas when the RRC’s orphaned well
prevention and remediation program—a scheme that included blanket bonds 95
and non-bonding schemes such as licensing fees and “good guy” reductions—did
not provide enough money to properly plug and abandon holes. Wyoming’s goal
should be to set up bonding requirements so that each company’s bond can cover
94
Interestingly, in 2001 and 2000, the annual levy was set at zero per inactive well to reduce
the growing Orphan Fund balance and to match the decreased activity level of orphan abandonment
and reclamations in 2000. The levy was set at zero based on the reasoning to only take money
from the upstream oil and gas industry when it was required. Orphan Well Association of Alberta
2002–2003 Annual Report.
95
A blanket bond is one bond that covers more that one well. Thus, one bond could cover
many or all wells in a single company’s portfolio.
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that company’s orphaned well responsibility. Furthermore, the money collected
should be tied to a particular well so that, if well ownership changes hands, the
state would continue to hold the funds necessary for covering the cost of plugging
and abandoning the well. This is particularly important within the realm of CBM
development. CBM wells are typically quite shallow, particularly when compared
to oil wells. Typical depths are 500 to 1,500 feet for these wells. Wells of this
depth can be quickly, easily, and cheaply drilled. This business thus attracts all
manner of developers, and the state must keep a tight rein on development in
order to prevent the ﬁnancially challenged, capital constrained, or irresponsible
operators from converging on Wyoming and then departing suddenly when the
prices fall again, leaving their responsibilities for remediation, well plugging, and
surface damage costs unmet.
Recent changes in Texas law may provide Wyoming a good starting point of
view, particularly if focused through the lens of CBM production. Texas’ problems
with orphaned wells are rooted in the fact that the bonding procedures were not
responsive to maneuvers by producers short on cash but savvy to various ‘outs’
that could be used to avoid responsibility for properly plugging and abandoning
wells. In addition, before reforming their well-bonding measures, Texas allowed
the following three options for producers as alternatives to well bonding:96
(1) A $100 annual fee if the operator had 48 consecutive
months of acceptable operation under remediation statutes
and regulations.
(2) A fee equaling 3% of the otherwise applicable bond amount
described in the ﬁrst two options.
(3) A lien on tangible personal property in an amount equal
to the otherwise applicable bond amounts in the ﬁrst two
options.
Wyoming’s regulatory position would be much stronger if a requirement
existed mandating the collection of money via a bond to plug a well if the producer
proves unable to do so. Each well could have money speciﬁcally earmarked for
that particular well, rather than a pool of money provided by a blanket bond. In
other words, Wyoming should act as if every well will be orphaned and the state
will have to pay to plug it. The shallow depth common to CBM wells, combined
with the size of Wyoming and the state’s allowance of one CBM gas well per forty
or eighty acres, means that active producers of CBM will hold a large number of
wells in their portfolio. If the producer pays the blanket bond, then the money

96
After September 1, 2004, these three options were no longer available in Texas. All operators
are now required to have a bond, letter of credit, or to make a cash deposit.
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available for plugging potentially abandoned holes is lessened for each. As Texas
has done, all options—save a well-speciﬁc bond or letter-of-credit—should be
forever eliminated. These options have proven ineffective in providing money
to plug orphaned wells in Texas, often placing the burden on companies who do
fulﬁll responsibilities, landowners, and taxpayers.
Furthermore, a change in control of a well need not reduce the amount
of money available to plug the well. If a portfolio of wells is passed from one
operator to another, the state-held funds to plug each well via a bond can remain
at the pre-sale level. Here again, limitation of the blanket bond is apparent. For
example, a producer could acquire a multitude of marginal wells and then go out
of business, leaving only a blanket bond to cover plugging all the orphaned wells
in the company’s portfolio. Eliminating the blanket bond and going to a per-well
bond requirement will require companies to devise methods, such as establishing
escrow accounts or performance bonds, or using the direct approach of having
the new company augment money held in the state with its own cash. As an
added feature, regulations could have a built-in mechanism for increasing the
bond amounts should costs and inﬂation escalate.
Other solutions to the problem of orphaned wells exist. Lease forms are
often off-the-shelf and used with little foresight. If the model lease forms drafted
and endorsed by the American Association of Professional Landmen (“AAPL”)97
were made more remediation-friendly, the number of orphan wells abandoned
in the future could be attenuated.98 Another suggestion is requiring every oil
company in Texas to annually plug a certain percentage of the shut-in wells on
its inventory. For example, the company could be required to plug 5–10% of
shut-in wells in their portfolio annually.99 Additionally, a prescription limiting
the amount of time a company has to plug such wells could be imposed. “Whole
lease” provisions—loopholes that allow an operator to wait on plugging an
unproductive well until drilling and production on the whole lease ceases—ought
to be eliminated. Combining regulatory responsibility for groundwater and surface

97
American Association of Professional Landmen, http://www.landman.org/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2009).
98
Loire Woodward Cantu, /N A #OLLISION #OURSE, CATTLEMEN, May 2004, available at http://
www.texascattleraisers.org/issues/2004/0504/collision.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). This article
mentions several problems and suggestions regarding orphan wells in addition to bonding, such
as changing the model lease forms, requiring the proper plugging and abandonment of a certain
percentage annually of each operator’s portfolio of orphaned wells, and elimination of “whole lease”
loopholes. )D
99
This provision could potentially eliminate wells that might return to production under
better economic conditions. If such a provision were ever adopted, care would have to be taken
to require plugging of wells clearly below any threshold of realistic future economically-sound
productivity, while also allowing the shut-in of wells that could realistically be reworked and made
proﬁtable with higher oil prices.
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water into one agency, as opposed to dividing it between the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality100 and the RRC, respectively, is touted by some as a
solution to inconsistent regulatory enforcement.101
One of the greatest causes of orphaned wells and ensuing pollution, surface
disruption and damage, and economic waste are unnecessary wells kept aﬂoat by
conservation schemes incentivizing “small parcel” wells by marginal producers.
In Texas, state coddling of small producers and the refusal to mandate orderly
ﬁeld development through unitization and spacing has resulted in a plethora
of unnecessary wells produced by unstable operators.102 This phenomenon is
particularly ominous for Wyoming. Boom conditions, combined with the shallow
depth common to CBM wells with small proration units, means that producers of
CBM will end up with a lot of wells in their portfolio. If the producer pays a ﬁxed
blanket bond, then the money available for plugging a potentially abandoned
hole is lessened for each producer as the producer’s portfolio increases. For the
same reasons, all options, save a well-speciﬁc bond or letter-of-credit, should be
eliminated. Furthermore, the change in control of a well should not in any way
affect the money available to plug the well. If a portfolio of wells is passed from
one operator to another, the money that the state holds to plug each well via a
bond should remain at the level it was before the sale. This will prevent ﬁnancially
unstable operators from orphaning a multitude of wells with one bankruptcy.
Finally, if a well produces water fresh enough to be an asset to the surface
owner, an option could exist for a producer to assign a well to a rancher. The
rancher might want the water from the CBM well for irrigation or livestock.
This complicates the orphan well issue, but the water well could be a resource for
surface owners or the state.

APPENDIX A:
A SURVEY OF SURFACE DAMAGE ACTS—EAST & WEST
What follows is a glimpse at the various SDAs currently enacted, with analysis
split into SDAs in the western and eastern United States.

3$!S IN THE 7ESTERN 5NITED 3TATES
North Dakota and Montana have been previously discussed.

100

Texas Commission of Environmental Quality, http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2009).
101

See Cantu, supra note 7, at 7–8.

102

Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 4HE &EDERAL 'OVERNMENT AS A 5SEFUL %NEMY 0ERSPECTIVES ON THE "USH
%NERGY%NVIRONMENTAL !GENDA FROM THE 4EXAS /ILlELDS, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

33

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 2, Art. 3

446

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

Oklahoma does not require that surface damages be paid as a matter of
course, but the behavior of the mineral owners suggests they believe the SDA
of Oklahoma creates an obligation to pay for any and all damages suffered by
the surface owner.103 Arbitration of damages is conducted by three assessors—
one appointed by the landowner, one appointed by the producer, and the
third appointed by the other two.104 If the appraisers, by majority vote, decide
no compensation is owed, none is due, but the landowner can appeal. Upon
appeal to a court, if the court’s judgment is less than that of the appraisal of
damages, the landowner will not receive attorney fees as part of the damages.
Often what occurs is that the landowner will “lowball” or “sandbag”—slang used
by lawyers for purposely quoting an unreasonably low damage estimate—on the
appraisal because he knows he is going to go to court anyway. Then, in court, the
landowner will be sure to get a judgment far over what was agreed upon, thus
assuring attorney fees.105
In South Dakota, the SDA106 requires the mineral developer to give written
notice to the surface owner at least thirty days prior to the beginning of operations.
The notice is to go to the address of the surface owner as ascertained by the
county records for the land to be subject to development. The notice shall be
explicit enough to allow the surface owner to approximate the disruption and
damage that the mineral development will cause.
The amount of surface damages may be determined using any method both
sides agree upon. Damages can be paid in annual installments, but the surface
owner can only be compensated for harm caused by exploration with one single
lump sum payment. In addition, the payment is to be to the titleholder of the
land and assignment or reservation of such compensation is prohibited unless

103
Ronald W. Polston, 3URFACE 2IGHTS OF -INERAL /WNERS7HAT (APPENS 7HEN *UDGES -AKE
,AW AND .OBODY ,ISTENS, 63 N.D. L. REV. 41, 55–56 (1987). In a survey conducted by the author,
producers of forty-six of forty-seven wells drilled accepted responsibility for some measure of surface
damages. One operator, when asked why he paid, simply responded with a copy of Oklahoma’s
SDA. Owen Anderson, a professor of oil and gas law at the University of Oklahoma, has said that
surface owners and tenants generally know the “going rate” of surface damage settlements in the
area around their land and seem to expect something akin to that value whatever the particular
scenario involved. He said that surface owners routinely expect some measure of payment. (From a
special talk given in conjunction to Owen Anderson’s 2003 Oil and Gas Law class at the University
of Oklahoma College of Law.)
104

Bruce Stallsworth, in his article ,EGISLATION (ITS -ID 0OINT /IL AND 'AS "ILLS 0ROGRESS
3URFACE $AMAGE 2EFORMS in the April 2004 edition of WellHead April 2004, noted that two bills
currently in committee Oklahoma (HB 2541 and SB 1296) contain language that will require
that all three appraisers used in a surface damage settlement be state-certiﬁed. These bills have
met resistance from landowners. Bruce Stallsworth, ,EGISLATION (ITS -ID 0OINT /IL AND 'AS "ILLS
0ROGRESS3URFACE $AMAGE 2EFORMS, WELLHEAD, April 2004.
105

Producers in Oklahoma jocularly refer to this as “getting Munsoned.”

106

See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 45-5A-1 to -11 (1997).
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made to a surface lessee. The mineral developer is to pay damages to the surface
owner equal to the amount of damages sustained for:
(1) Loss of agricultural production;
(2) Lost land value; and
(3) Lost value of improvements caused by mineral development.
The surface owner, in order to receive compensation, must give the mineral
developer notice in writing of damages sustained within two years that the damage
became apparent or should have been apparent.
Unless controlled by another written agreement, the mineral developer,
within sixty days of receipt of damages sustained by the surface owner, must make
an “offer of settlement.” This must be accepted or rejected within sixty days of
receipt of the offer of settlement. If rejected, the surface owner can seek redress
in court of proper jurisdiction. In a clause not mentioned in any other SDA, this
SDA expressly does not apply to vehicles traveling on state highways.

3$!S IN THE %ASTERN 5NITED 3TATES
Speaking generally, SDAs east of the Mississippi are more prone to expressly
provide speciﬁc items for which surface owners can expect recovery and more
tightly stipulate notice, negotiations with the surface owner, and periods during
which the mineral owner can proceed with development. What follows is a list of
the high points and quirks of each of the SDAs in eastern states.
West Virginia’s SDA107 does not require that the mineral developer give the
landowner notice of entry.108 Items that require compensation are enumerated in
the law as are the surface damages that may be recovered for them if an offer of

107

See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-7-1 to -8 (1998).

W. VA. CODE § 22-7-7 (2009). The oil and gas developer must pay damages to cover
compensation to the surface owner for any of the following:
108

(1) Lost income or expenses incurred by mineral developers occupation.
(2) Market value of crops destroyed.
(3) Damage to water supplies.
(4) Cost of repair (up to replacement value) of personal property.
(5) Diminution of value of the surface after completion of the mineral
development.
All other common law claims remain intact. The surface owner, in order to receive compensation,
must give the mineral developer notice in writing of damages sustained within two years of the
time that the damage became apparent or should have been apparent. Unless otherwise provided
by written agreement, the mineral developer must, within sixty days of giving of notice of damages,
either make an offer of settlement or reject the claim. )D
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settlement fails. The alternative to court action is an arbitration method carefully
delineated in the statute.109
Tennessee’s SDA110 is very similar. A list of items requiring compensation
after notice is listed in the statute.111 The developer must then respond, offering
either a settlement or rejecting the claim. Upon either rejection of the demand for
damages or the offer of an unacceptable settlement, the surface owner can choose
to seek compensation in court or through arbitration.112

W. VA. CODE § 22-7-7 (2009). Within sixty days of notice of rejection of the surface damage
claim by the mineral developer, the surface owner can either (1) bring an action for compensation
in the court of proper jurisdiction; or (2) decide to have his compensation ﬁnally determined by
binding arbitration. The arbitration committee consists of three arbitrators—one picked by the
surface owner, one picked by the mineral developer, and the third selected by the ﬁrst two. If the
ﬁrst two arbitrators cannot agree on a third arbitrator, the matter will be turned over to the circuit
court of the county wherein the surface estate lies. )D
109

110

See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 to -608 (1989).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-604 (2009). The oil and gas developer must pay the surface
owner for:
111

(1) Lost income or expenses incurred as a result of being unable to use land
actually occupied by the driller’s operation or to which access is prevented by
such drilling operation for the purposes it was used prior to commencement
of the activity for which a permit was obtained, measured from the date the
operator enters upon the land;
(2) The market value of crops destroyed or damaged;
(3) Any damage to a water supply in use prior to the commencement of the
permitted activity;
(4) The cost of repair of personal property up to the value of replacement by
personal property of like age, wear and quality; and
(5) The diminution in value, if any, of the surface lands and other property
after completion of the surface disturbance done pursuant to the activity for
which the permit was issued, determined according to the actual use made
thereof by the surface owner immediately prior to the commencement of the
permitted activity.
Any surface owners who want to receive compensation must notify the oil and gas developer by
certiﬁed mail, return receipt requested, of the damages sustained by the person within three years
after the injury occurs. )D
TENN. CODE ANN. § 60-1-607 (2009). If the surface owner wanting compensation receives
a written rejection, rejects any counter-offer of the oil and gas developer, or receives no reply, he may
bring an action for compensation in a court of proper jurisdiction. If the amount of compensation
awarded by arbitration or the court is greater than that which had been offered by the oil and gas
developer, the person seeking compensation shall also be awarded reasonable attorney fees, costs
of expert witnesses, any other costs which may be legally assessed, and interest on the amount of
the ﬁnal compensation awarded from the day drilling was commenced. This scheme avoids the
lowballing seen in Oklahoma, as the surface owner cannot give an artiﬁcially low damage value
because the producer can take him up on it, whereas in Oklahoma, the surface owner can give a low
value, then refuse anything the arbitrators come up with and go to court assured the judgment will
be larger than his previous bogus damage value.
112
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Illinois’ SDA113 contains two clever stipulations. First, the developer is
required to give notice and offer to negotiate with the surface owner.114 Second,
the producer must obtain a certiﬁcate from the state assessor’s ofﬁce providing
state clearance to drill.115 The surface owner is encouraged by the statute to meet
with the producer—failure of the surface owner to contact the operator at least ﬁve
days prior to the proposed commencement of drilling operations is conclusively
deemed a waiver of the right to meet by the surface owner. The surface owner
is entitled to reasonable compensation from the mineral producer for damages
caused by the drilling operations.116

The surface owner, instead of bringing an action in court, can request the mineral developer to
deliver in writing by certiﬁed mail, return receipt requested, that compensation be determined by
binding arbitration. If the oil and gas developer agrees to binding arbitration, the mineral developer
shall notify the surface owner of consent to arbitration in writing within ﬁfteen days of receiving the
request. In the event of binding arbitration, compensation to be awarded the surface owner shall be
determined by a disinterested arbitrator chosen by the surface owner and the oil and gas developer
from a list of arbitrators approved by the American Arbitration Association—although the statute
does not say how they choose. )D
113

See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1–530/6 (2001).

765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/4 (2009). The operator must give written notice prior to the
commencement of drilling.
114

This notice includes:
(1) The location and date of entry;
(2) Photocopy of the drilling application submitted to the Department of
Natural Resources;
(3) Name, address and phone number of the applicant; and
(4) Offer to “discuss” with the surface owner the following:
(a) Placement of roads
(b) Points of entry
(c) Construction and placement of pits
(d) Restoration of fences to be cut
(e) Use of water
(f ) Removal of trees
(g) Surface water drainage changes caused by drilling operations.
)D
115
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/4 (2009). This certiﬁcate identiﬁes the surface owner(s) and,
once approved, acts as conclusive evidence as to the identities of surface owners—somewhat akin to
a division order—and acts as proof of producer’s compliance with the SDA.

765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/6(A) (2009). In Illinois, compensation must be paid in a manner
“mutually agreeable” to both the surface owner and the mineral developer. )D at (B). However, the
failure to agree upon the amount will not prevent the mineral operator from beginning operations,
although compensation will be made within ninety days of completing the well. If compensation is
not made, or not made to the level requested, the surface owner’s remedy is a lawsuit. In addition,
the mineral developer can only use that portion of the surface reasonably necessary for mineral
development. )D
116
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Kentucky also has an SDA117 that is very similar to that found in Illinois.
A certiﬁcate of ownership is required, as is notice to the surface owner, the
requirements of which are expressly listed in the statute.118 The surface owner
can recover for damages to crops, structures, etc. The payment shall be made in
accordance with whatever is agreeable to the parties, but a failure to agree shall
not prevent a mineral developer from entering the land. The operator must pay the
surface owner within ninety days of completion of the well. If the payment is not
made, or if no agreement is reached in the amount of the surface damages, then
the surface owners can seek a judgment. Finally, as in the Illinois statute, surface
restoration is also required.119

APPENDIX B:
CASE LAW REGARDING COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT
IN WYOMING AND MONTANA
In December 2005, the Ruckelshaus Institute of Environment and Natural
Resources, in conjunction with the University of Wyoming, delivered to the ofﬁce
of the governor of Wyoming the “Water Production from Coalbed Methane
Development in Wyoming: a Summary of Quantity and Management Options.”
The “Ruckelshaus Report” contained summaries of the amount of CBM
development in various parts of Wyoming, the speciﬁcs of CBM development,
scientiﬁc reports on contamination of surface and groundwater by CBM
produced water, and suggestions as to what steps should be taken to govern the
process of permitting produced water impoundments as well as other facets of
CBM development. This report created controversy, particularly with the proCBM production contingent within the Wyoming legislature, some of whom
apparently used the report as a reason to vote against certain funding initiatives for
the Institute and the University because of what they saw as anti-CBM sentiment
within the report.120 The Ruckelshaus Report mentioned six cases then currently
117

See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(5) (2000).

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595 (2009). Within ninety days prior to the giving of notice to
the surface owner, the mineral developer must get from the Property Valuation Ofﬁce a certiﬁcation
which identiﬁes the correct surface owner for the land on which development is intended. )D
§ 353.595 (3)(b). This will act as conclusive evidence of surface ownership. The mineral producer
must also provide notice of impending operations, including information such as drilling location
and contact information. )D
118

119

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.595(7) (2009).
In conjunction with the plugging and abandonment of any well or the reworking
of any well, the operator shall restore the surface and any improvements thereon
to a condition as near as practicable to their condition prior to commencement of
the work. The surface owner and operator may waive this requirement in writing,
subject to the approval of the department that the waiver is in accordance with its
administrative regulations.

&REUDENTHAL 3AYS 5NIVERSITY OF 7YOMING .EEDS TO "E A 0LACE OF &REE %XPRESSION, LOCAL NEWS
8 ONLINE, Jan. 26, 2008.
120
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in litigation concerning actions, mostly by environmentalist groups, against state
and federal government agencies in Wyoming and Montana for issuing permits
allowing CBM developments. These types of actions have typically been the ﬁrst
wave of litigation to meet natural resource development on state or federal lands
in other states for other uses. Later, private disputes with less-idealistic bents
became more common. Since the CBM boom in Wyoming is still fairly novel,
the second wave of private litigation has not yet developed. Below are detailed the
ﬁve cases mentioned or cited within the Ruckelshaus Report on pp. 38–39.

0ENNACO %NERGY )NC V 53 $EPT OF )NTERIOR 121
In 0ENNACO, a dispute arose involving three leases that were auctioned off
by the BLM in the Powder River Basin. Environmental groups sued the BLM
claiming that the agency failed to follow proper procedure according to the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) prior to leasing BLM land for CBM
production. The BLM depended on two environmental reports to demonstrate
its compliance with NEPA. The ﬁrst report was called the Buffalo Resource
Management Plan Environmental Impact Statement (“Buffalo RMP EIS”).
This report was published in October 1985 and did not address environmental
issues speciﬁc to CBM production. The second report, the Wyodak Coal Bed
Methane Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement (“Wyodak DEIS”) was
published in 1999 and addressed post-lease environmental issues relating to CBM
production.
The court ruled the BLM failed to meet NEPA’s pre-lease environmental
reporting requirements. Neither the Buffalo RMP EIS nor the Wyodak DEIS
were found to be sufﬁcient to satisfy NEPA’s requirements. The Buffalo report
was written prior to the explosion of CBM production in the area, and was
written to address the environmental impact of regular oil and gas operations
which differ substantially from the environmental impact of CBM production.
The Wyodak DEIS addressed post-lease CBM-speciﬁc environmental impact from
CBM production, and therefore, was not sufﬁcient for NEPA’s pre-production
reporting requirements. Several subsequent opinions have cited this case.

.ORTHERN 0LAINS 2ESOURCE #OUNCIL V 5NITED 3TATES "UREAU OF ,AND
-ANAGEMENT 122
This case was brought by another environmental group seeking to curtail
development, but with a twist—before this case was ﬁled, the Federal District Court
of Montana had found that the BLM’s initial Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”) was inadequate. This dispute arose to determine the extent to which
121

Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 377 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2004).

122

N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 03-69-BLG-RWA (D.
Mont. Apr. 5, 2005).
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CBM production and development could continue pending the completion of
the BLM’s ﬁnal EIS. This time around, the issue involved the scope of the court’s
order. One side wanted CBM production to be limited to production already in
place until the BLM’s ﬁnal EIS report was completed. The other party wanted
to follow the BLM-proposed plan to limit growth in production to a deﬁned
geographical area with heightened environmental impact requirements, and a cap
of 500 new wells per year. An amicus party argued for a larger geographical area,
less stringent environmental controls, and more wells per year until the BLM
completed an acceptable EIS.
The court ordered that CBM production should follow the course set out by
the BLM (limited geographical area, stringent environmental controls, and a cap
of 500 new wells per year) but that the BLM must refuse all permits to drill unless
the applicant demonstrated compliance with the environmental restrictions.

7YOMING /UTDOOR #OUNCIL V 53 !RMY #ORPS OF %NGINEERS 123
The Army Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) issued a certain ‘General Permit
98-08’ as a way to address the growing need for permits to discharge dredge
and ﬁll materials associated with CBM development in the Powder River Basin.
Accompanying General Permit 98-08 was a Combined Decisions Document
(“CDD”) to satisfy the reporting demands of NEPA. The Wyoming Outdoor
Council, the Powder River Basin Resource Council, and others challenged the
issuance of General Permit 98-08 and the efﬁcacy of the CDD.
The issue the Wyoming District faced in this case was whether General Permit
98-08 and the CDD were arbitrarily and capriciously issued without regard to the
standards set by the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and NEPA. The court remanded
the case to the Corps to address the problems with General Permit 98-08 and the
CDD, and held that the Corps’ reports were arbitrary and capricious in:
(1) failing to consider impacts to private ranchlands;
(2) failing to consider cumulative impacts to non-wetland
resources;
(3) relying on mitigation measures wholly unsupported by the
record; and
(4) inding that cumulative effects on the aquatic environment
were minimal without assessing lands other than wetlands.124
123

Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 02-CV-155-D, slip op. (D.
Wyo. Jan. 7, 2005).
124

Williams Prod. RMT Co. v. Maycock, Decision Letter, Campbell County Civ. Action No.
26099, slip op. (Wyo. 8th Dist. Oct. 11, 2005).
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On March 16, 2006, Judge Keith Kautz of the Eighth Judicial District Court
of Wyoming resolved a dispute between Williams and Maycock concerning
whether there was a state waterway easement to use creek beds on Maycock’s
land for discharge of water from Williams’ CBM development. Because of the
infrequency of the water ﬂow within the banks of the creeks in question, the court
decided that the creeks were not waterways; therefore, there was no state easement
that Williams could use to dispose of the CBM water.
In addition to the preceding ﬁve cases, the Institute’s report mentioned one
dismissed case from Montana which dealt with air quality concerns under the
Clean Air Act. This case was dismissed prior to trial according to the Clerk of the
Court in the Federal District Court of Montana.125 Several briefs and motions,
however, were still ﬁled in the court as of July 3, 2008.
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Envtl. Def. v. Norton, No. CV-04-64-BLG-RWA (D. Mt.).
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